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ABSTRACT
In today's world of E-Commerce everything comes online like Music,E-Books, Shopping all most
everything is online. If you are using some service  or  buying  things  online  then you have  to
pay for  that. For that you have to do Net Banking or you have to use Credit card which will do
online payment for you.  In  today's  environment  when  everything  is online, the service you are
using for E-Payment must be secure and you must  protect  your  banking  information  like  debit
card  or  credit  card information  from  possible  threat  of  hacking. There were lots way to
threat like Key logger, Forgery Detection, Phishing, Shoulder surfing. Therefore, we reveal our
actual information of Bank and Credit Card then there will be  a  chance  to  lose  data  and  same
credit  card  and  hackers  can  use banking information for malicious purpose.  In  this  paper  we
discuss  available  E-Payment  protocols,  examine  its advantages  and  delimitation's  and  shows
that  there  are  steel  needs  to design  a  more  secure  E-Payment  protocol.  The  suggested
protocol  is based  on  using  hash  function  and  using  dynamic  or  virtual  password, which
protects  your  banking  or  credit  card  information  from  possible threat of hacking when doing
online transactions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
E payment is a subset of an e-commerce transaction to include electronic payment for buying and
selling goods or services offered through the Internet. Generally we think of electronic payments
as referring to online transactions on the Internet, there are actually many forms of electronic
payments. As technology developing, the range of devices and processes to transact electronically
continues to increase while the percentage of cash and check transactions continues to decrease. In
the US, for example, checks have declined from 85% of non-cash payments in 1979 to 59% in
2002, and electronic payments have grown to 41%.The Internet has the potential to become the
most active trade intermediary within a decade. Also, Internet shopping may revolutionize
retailing by allowing consumers to sit in their homes and buy an enormous variety of products and
services from all over the worlds. Many businesses and consumers are still wary of conducting
extensive business electronically. However, almost everyone will use the form of E Commerce in
near future.
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The e-payments are stored and then converted to digital type. This will cause new difficulties
during the developing secure e-payment protocol. The payment is simply be duplicated against the
conventional physical paying methods. As the digital payment is characterized as simple
sequences of bits, nothing in them stops them copying. As we know to do E-Payment we have to
provide our debit or credit card information. At this time if our debit or credit card information is
stolen by hackers than this information is misused for many purpose. Therefore, the process of E-
Payment must be secure and confidential. Some website use well known secure channel and
protocols like SSL/TLS to protect debit or credit card information but most commercial websites
still rely on poor protection mechanism. Attacks to which secure channel authentication approach
is still vulnerable are listed below.
Forgery Detection: Where some secret key like public or private key is detected by hackers during
transaction. If the formula to calculate this is very easy and information can be get easily.
Shoulder Surfing: Here attacker use a hidden camera to record all keyboard actions of a user and
these actions on a keyboard can be studied later to figure out user’s credit card information like
account no and password. This attack most likely occurs in insecure and crowded public
environments such as Internet cafe, shopping mall, airport, etc.
Key logger: This attack contains or installs some malicious code in machines, which capture
keystrokes and stores them somewhere in the machine or send them back to the adversary. This
attack provides the adversary with any strings of texts that a person might enter online like credit
card information.
Phishing: This attack proven to be very effective, will acquires sensitive information, such as
credit card information, by masquerading as a trustworthy person or business in an electronic
communication. For example, a phisher can set up a fake website which will sell things at cheapest
price ever and then send some emails to potential victims to persuade them to access the fake
website.
Users who don’t aware of this fake website will go to this website and gives credit card
information to buy things. This way, the phisher can easily get all information of credit card. From
all of this fact we have noted that a password should be dynamic to prevent above attacks. It is
very reasonable that a password should be constant for the purpose of easily remembering it.
However the price of easy to remember is that the password can be stolen by others and then used
in e-payment. Also we should able to set maximum amount which is transferred during one
transaction, so that if our debit or credit card information is stolen by attackers, we will not loss all
of our money and instead loss only money which is set here.
1.1 E-payment protocol
The E-Payment protocol is a protocol, which solves the problems related to old protocols by
introducing a new concept. Our protocol strongly follows characteristics like Anonymity,
Divisibility, Transference, Over spending detection. Through using our protocol you can get
anonymous cash Transaction and efficiency at same time. Our protocols is protected by dynamic
or virtual password that involves a small amount of human computing in an internet based
environment, which will be resistant to attacks like Phishing scan, a Trojan horse, shoulder-
surfing, etc. We purpose a virtual password concept that requires a small amount of human
computing to secure user's password concept. We will adopt user-determined randomized linear
generation function to secure user's temporary password.  We are going to adopt user-determined
randomized linear generation functions to secure users passwords based on the fact that a serer has
more information than any adversary does. For this protocol when company register for a new
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account, Bank or Credit card provides him a secret code which will generate temporary password
and random number for user. With the real password and credential information user can set the
limit balance for the withdrawal from account. This will be done a web service provided by bank
of credit card providers. Now once user will get information about random number, password and
user name,an user can use this temporary credentials to buy an company account in our
information. Therefore, now that account only allow up to a limited balance withdrawal from the
user account. User already sets the limit so if anything wrong happens that at max user can losses
only up to limit balance from his account. If user requires more money online then they can
generate more random number and password as given by application. Therefore, at any point in
real time transaction user will not going to reveal his original information so his/her account
information will not be compromised.
Organization of the paper: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe related work
about done so far in chapter 2. In chapter 3, we propose the virtual password scheme. In chapter 4,
we describe the proposed work. Finally, we conclude our paper and describe our future work.
2. LITERATURE SURVEY
2.1. Virtual Password
The authors in [7] introduce the concept of the E-cash since than it is still hot favorite topic for
research. In [8] [9] authors give the each system in single condition support. In [2] authors give
design of E-cash system based on offline concept. In [3] authors discuss model based on java
technology. In [1] authors used the concept of virtual password for email login system.
Figure 1 : Login Page[1]
International Journal on Cryptography and Information Security(IJCIS),Vol.1, No.1,December 2011
4
Figure 2: helper application for PC [1]
Figure 3 : Helper application for Mobile [1]
In this paper we had extend this concept to E-cash system. In [4] authors used the concept of blind
signature concept. In [5] [6] authors extend the E-cash for faster and efficient in terms of
efficiency. In [10] authors used the concept of zero knowledge for E-cash system. In [11] authors
proposed E-cash for offline support. In [12-17] authors proposed the E-cash with security and
several variations. But as we observed in all of the previous approach, when any communication
or secret of customer is compromised than attacker can transfer all money from victim’s account.
In our approach even the temporary password of customer compromised, then attacker only
transfer money up to certain limit, so giving privacy to customer’s account more privacy and
anonymity.
During E-Payment process bank gives us all details to do E-Payment, like user-id and
password. We will enter this password during E-Payment process. Here we will enter same
password each time we do transaction, so we can call this password a static password. But it is
dangerous to use static password during E-Payment, because hackers steal once this password he
can use this password for E-Payment or other purpose. Therefore, we need to use a password,
which will change each time when we do transaction, but it's not possible to get new password
each time from bank. Therefore, we will use a password called dynamic or virtual password,
which will change during each transaction.  A dynamic or virtual password is a password gendered
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from static password and some random number using virtual function. Therefore, user first
generates a dynamic password and this generated password is submitted during actual e-payment
process. Therefore, if hackers steal this password he can only able to use this in one transaction in
next transaction he need to give new password, which is not easy to generate without virtual
function.
2.1.1. Virtual Password Approach
A virtual password P is composed of two parts, a fixed alphanumeric A and a function F.
Password P can be computed by P=(A, F) and function F can be computed by F (A, R) = Pd,
where R is a random number and Pd is a dynamic password used for authentication. Since we call
P=(A, F) a virtual password, we call F a virtual function. The user input includes (ID, Pd), where
ID is user ID and Pd is virtual password. On the server side, the server can also calculate Pd in the
same way to compare it with the submitted password.
In the virtual password approach, the registration process is similar to other traditional approaches
i.e. user enters user ID and password; the only difference is that user needs to send virtual function
during registration phase. The server at the end of registration process delivers this function
information to the user. The user needs to remember this function together with the password they
have chosen. The user-specified password and the system-generated function are combined into a
virtual password. We can say that virtual password approach is resistant to directory attack, where
users creates password either related to their own name, birth date, other simple words, etc. In
virtual password approach user can change virtual password also, different from the traditional
scheme, users can change the fixed part of the virtual password or the virtual function, or even
both.
2.1.2. Virtual functions
To generate virtual password user needs to use virtual function. Virtual function takes two inputs,
one is fixed password and second is random number. Here fixed password is a password, which
user has entered during registration process and random number is a number prompted on login
screen by server. Virtual function should be unique per user, so that a user cannot know the
computation process of virtual password of other user. This function is provide by bank to user
through email or prompted on screen. Virtual function should be simple so that user can remember
it. But for better password protection it should be hard. Bank can provide a helper application to
user, which use this virtual function and generate password for user. If this application is not
available to user, user needs to calculate it manually.
The virtual function plays a critical role in the virtual password. There are an infinite number of
virtual functions, so that designing an appropriate function is very critical to the success of our
scheme. If a helper-application application is available for the user, the user needs to type the
random salt into the helper-application, and subsequently, the dynamic password is generated by
the helper-application. Then the user types in the generated dynamic password in the login screen.
In this way, the extra time required is very small and the precision will be one hundred percent
correct as long as the user types the correct random salt displayed on the login screen.
If there is no helper-application for a user, the user needs to calculate the dynamic password from
the virtual function with the inputs, random salt and the fixed part of the virtual password. The
whole login process may take a little bit longer because it requires the user to perform some
calculations. This must work for the user who has no mobile device, so in that case, the virtual
function should not be too complicated for human computing.
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2.2. E-cash Payment
Many protocols are designed to do secure E-Payment and are listed below. In [18] authors
proposed system which is relied on a single use token method. The user creates blinded e-bank
currency note and passes it to the bank to be signed using bank public key. The bank signs the
currency note, subtracts the value from the user account, and returns the signed currency note back
to the user. The user removes the blind thing and utilizes it to buy goods from the super market.
The super market checks the authenticity of the bank currency note using the bank public key and
passes it to the bank where they are verified contrary to a list of currency note already used. The
amount is deposited into the supermarket account, the deposit approved, and the supermarket in
turn emits the merchandise.
In [19] authors proposed system which is a decentralized e-payment protocol, and it allow
payments as low as 1/10 of a cent. It employs a type of e-coins. It is introduced to make the cost of
committing a fraud, more than the cost of the real transaction. It utilizes asymmetric encryption
techniques for all information transactions. Millicent is a lightweight and secure scheme for e-
commerce through the Internet. It is developed to support to buy goods charging less than a cent. It
is relied on decentralized validation of  e-currency at the seller server without any further
communication, costly encryption, or off-line processing. In [20] authors suggested method in
which there is a possibility to reduce the number of messages engaged with every transaction.
Also, the lottery ticket scheme is relied on the assumption that financial agents are risk neutral and
will be satisfied with fair wagers. In [21] authors suggested methodwhere e-vouchers can be
moveable but the direct exchange between purchasers and vendors is impossible. As a result, a
financial agent is needed and this will raise the transactions charges of exchange.
In [22] authors suggested method inwhich supports multiple merchants is an efficient and flexible
protocol. The protocol is divided into three schemes: certificate issuing scheme, payment scheme,
and redemption scheme.  However it contains some limitations in his scheme like the system
performance is reduced by necessarily frequent signing in each transaction, the customer has to
keep different hash chains and  corresponding in-dices, however the overhead of merchants is
relatively high. To securely deposit, the bank has to collect all pay-words belonging to the same
chain. It needs an additional storage space and wastes undetermined waiting time and the dispute
arises if the merchant forges transaction records or the customer double spends.  However scheme
in [22] is most popular than others some limitations is observed by [23] like the system
performance is reduced by necessarily frequent signing in each transaction, the customer has to
keep different hash chains and corresponding indices; however the overhead of merchants is
relatively high. To securely deposit, the bank has to collect all pay words belonging to the same
chain. It needs an additional storage space and wastes undetermined waiting time, and the dispute
arises if the merchant forges transaction records or the customer double spends. The protocols with
idea of public key encryption scheme using the thought of  hash chain is presented by [23] and has
blind scheme using RSA-typed blind signature which overcomes limitations of Kim and Lee
protocol.
As we have seen many schemes, protocols and software have been designed to prevent e-payment
from possible threat of hacking. However to the best of our knowledge, so far, there is not a
scheme, which can defend against Shoulder-surfing, Key logger and Phishing at the same time. In
E payment protocol we will try to defend all of above attacks.
3. PROPOSED PROTOCOL FOR E-CASH
We have seen that when using above protocol, user has to send his secret information like debit or
credit card information to bank to get the certificate. We know banks use some secure protocol like
SSL/TLS for transmitting private data over the web is well-known in academic research, but most
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current commercial websites still rely on the relatively weak protection mechanism of user
authentications via plaintext password and user ID.
[1]has provided good concept of virtual password in his paper, which we can use here to secure
our E-Payment from possible threat of hacking. [1]suggested using virtual password, which we
have seen in above chapter. Virtual function is required to generate virtual password. [1]have first
suggested using following Linear Function.( ) = [ ( + ) + ] (1)
where a and Z are relatively prime, is one digit from the fixed part of the user’s virtual
password, is one random digit provided by the system, and a and c are the constant factors of
the linear function, which the user has to remember. The ( ) is a bijective function if and only if
a and Z are relatively prime.
[1]showed that using above function we can protect user password from  Phishing, key logger, and
shoulder-surfing attacks but not from multiple attacks. [1] showed that if user is lured to try to
login to any same phishing website more than twice, it will leak his/her password. Reason for that
is for any given ith digit of the fixed part of users virtual password, if user has tried more than
twice to login to the fake website, then adversary could obtain the two equations below: [ ( +) + ] = , and [ ( + ) + ] = . Now Bob can know that [ ( −)] = ( − ) , and as a result, it can calculate a. After a is identified by the
adversary, the system is broken. Then adversary can use user's account to login to the real website
in the following way. For the ith digit, adversary can just type in ( + ( − )) ,
where is the first time user typed in the ith digit in the fake website, is the ith random digit
provided by the fake website, and is the ith digit the system will display on the screen, which
adversary needs to login to users account.
To overcome this limitation [1] proposed randomized linear generation function that uses the value
of a digit in the dynamic password to calculate a subsequent digit in the dynamic password.
B(xi) = ( ) ,( ) , , ,… (2)
Where a is a constant which the user needs to remember but c is not. The most interesting part of
the function is that c will be a random number which the user randomly picks each time when the
user tries to login to the system. Since gcd(a, Z)=1, the above function is also a bijective function
regardless of the c value. Because c is also unknown to server, the server knows that c ∈{0,1…Z-
1}. The authentication could be done as follows.
Let B-1(x) be the reverse function of B(x). After the server gets the user’s keyed dynamic password
k1,k2...kn, and the fixed part of the virtual password of the user, x1,x2…xn, the server can
perform the following verification:
Verify ()
{For each digit u∈{0,1...Z-1} {
For each digit in the dynamic password the user typed
{wi =B-1(ki,u)}
if (w1w2…wn= x1x2…xn) return true}
Return false
}
The algorithm above guarantees that if the user has input the correct password, the system will
grant him/her entrance whatever the random number he/she picked. However, it is also true that
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for each user, there will be multiple (exactly Z) acceptable dynamic passwords existing for each
specific login session. This may increase the probability that the adversary’s random input happens
to be the correct password. However, if the length of your password is long enough, the
probability is very small, i.e., Z/2n, where n is the length of the password.
A scheme with equation (2) can defend against Phishing, keylogger, shoulder-surfing, and
multiple attacks as follows.This function now also secures against multiple attacks. If an adversary
has tricked a user into logging into his fake website twice, the adversary obtains k1=(ax1+y1+x2+c)
mod Z and k1 '=(ax1+y1'+ x2+c') mod Z, where a, m1, c, and c' are unknown to the adversary, and
then what information the adversary can figure out is the (c'- c) mod Z=(y1'-y1)+(k1'-k1). Since the
c and c' were randomly chosen by the user, (c'-c)  does not provide any information. If the
adversary cannot work out some clue about the first digit of the dynamic password k1, he/she
cannot find about k2 and the later digits in the dynamic password. Therefore, using the linear
function with a random number can remove the possibility of multiple dynamic password attacks.
We slightly modify this concept to get more secure E-Payment.
With the real password and Credential information user can set the limit balance for the
withdrawal from account.  This will be done a web service provided by bank of credit card
providers. Now once user will get information about random number, password and user name an
user can use this temporary credentials to buy an company account in our information. Therefore,
now that account only allow up to a limited balance withdrawal from the user account. User
already sets the limit so if any thing wrong happens that at max user can losses only up to limit
balance from his account. If user requires more money online then they can generate more random
number and password as given by application.
To get more security on E-Payment protocol we will use secure HTTP channels, which will
transfer data in encrypted mode. In sattars e-payment protocol many information transferred from
one end to another end many times. This is the point where hackers can play role, they can able to
intercept this information and by every time inspecting this values they can get the logic of
formula used by bank or user and can easily hack the system. Therefore, here instead of passing
the information from one end to other end we can save this information’s and return this
information whenever required.
We first modify the actual information by using predefined formula and then save or pass this
information using RC5-32 encryption system. We can make a application which will do this work
and can installed on both side. On opposite this application first decrypt this information and then
apply predefined formula to calculate actual information.
Also we will not save any information on client side, we will save all the information on secure
database created on bank side. Therefore, hackers can have less change to hack this information
ever. The information calculated from client side is passed using our application to bank side so
bank will save this information. And bank does not need to call on client side to get this
information they have all the required information on his side. Here this application is unique per
user so that they can’t get information processing logic of other use. Therefore, the suggested
modified protocol is shown as below.
Step 1: Bank
1.1. Select secretly and randomly two large prime p and q
1.2. Calculate modulus nB = p * q
1.3. Compute (n) = (p −1)(q −1)
1.4. Choose exponent key e where 1 < e < (n) and gcd(e, ( (n)) = 1
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1.5. Calculate private key w where e *w = 1mod (n)
1.6. Determine the public key (e, nB) and private key (w, (n), p, q)
Step 2: User
2.1. Get required information from bank using suggested application.
2.2. Select arbitrary numbers r and u
2.3. Calculate a = re * h(x0)( u2 + 1) mod (n)
2.4. Save (b, a) using suggested application on bank side.
Note that information b can indicate the expiry date; the value of cash (higher limit) that the user
can employ that is the funds of every hash currency.
Step 3: Bank
3.1. Select an arbitrary number x1< (n)
3.2. Save x1 using suggested application.
Step 4: User
4.1. Get required information from bank using suggested application.
4.3. Choose an arbitrary value r1
4.4. Calculate b2= r * r1
4.4. Calculate = (b2)e * (u - x1) mod (n) and save it using using suggested application.
Step 5: Bank
5.1. Calculate -1 mod (n)
5.2. Compute t1 = h (b)w * (a (x12+1) * -2) 2*w mod (n)
5.3. save ( -1, t1) using suggested application.
Step 6: User
6.1. Get required information from bank using suggested application.
6.2. Calculate c1 = (u* x1+1) -1 * (b2)e=(u* x1+1) (u - x1)-1 mod (n)
6.3. Calculate s1 = t1* r2 * (r1)4 mod (n)
Here also this application is lightweight they can give much load or performance problem. Using
this we can hide our actual information from hackers and do secure transactions. [23]has used
same transaction scheme of pay-word. Where root value of pay-words is merged with si that
obtain from the bank B, which enables the user to employ the rest of the unspent pay-words in
chain for multiple payments to other merchants. But her if this Si is stolen by hackers for any
transaction than he can hack other transactions also.Therefore, here instead of using this old Si is
value we have to use new value given by bank each time we do transaction for different merchant.
Also we use hash key and function to get this new value. This will secure our E-payment protocol
so that we cannot loss all of our money and only loss a part which is hacked by hacker in particular
transaction.
Also in [23] protocol it is too time consuming for multiple merchants, so here we can use hash
function and also store this function on server side and use same logic of virtual function to protect
this.For this protocol when person registered for new account, bank gives him a secret code and
general application which can generate temporary password and random number for user. With the
real password user can set the limit balance for the withdrawal from account. Now user enters the
secret number in the application and gets a random number and associated password for that
random number. Now user will enter his user name, random number and the password as given by
the application. Therefore, now online account only allow the up to limit balance to be withdrawal
from the user account. Now if by chance random number and password for it is compromised than
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at max user can loss only up to limit balance from his account. If user require more money than the
limit balance than he can generate more random number and password from the application.
Therefore, at any point during the transaction user do not enter his real password so his account
never compromise. The application can be general so it can install even on the supported mobile
also or in personal PC of a user.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we discussed how to prevent E-Payment system from possible threat of hacking. We
have shown that our protocol is secure in multiple transaction and also do not use large key's so it
is also less  time consuming. We proposed a virtual password concept involving a small amount of
human computing to secure users’ passwords in on-line environments. We adopted user-
determined randomized linear generation functions to secure users’ passwords based on the fact
that a server has more information than any adversary does. We analyzed how the proposed
scheme defends against Forgery Detection, Phishing, key logger, and shoulder-surfing attacks.
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